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1. Introduction 
The ultimate explanation for the definiteness effect in existential sentences 
depends in part on decisions about the class of existential sentences. Probably no 
one is in doubt about examples such as those in (I): 
(I) a. There is a fly in your soup. 
b. There are three students waiting to be seen. 
c. There are people to see and places to go. 
A crucial question here is whether or not examples like those m (::?.) should be 
included in this category or regarded as belonging to a different construction: 
(2) a. There is the leftover chicken from last night. 
b. There are only thee and me (and sometimes l wonder about thee). 
c. There is the laundry to be brought in and the dishes to be dried. 
In this paper I want to defend the position that the examples in (2) belong to 
essentially the same construction as those in ( 1) (thus supporting the views of, 
e.g., Bolinger 1977, Barwise and Cooper 1981, Woisetschlaeger 1983, and 
Lumsden 1988). Hence I will argue that the definiteness effect should not be 
regarded as a prohibition against (some) definites but rather the fact that (some) 
existenllals with definites require special contextualization. This m tum suggests 
that the best account of this effect will be m pragmatic, rather than purely 
syntactic or semantic, terms. Finally, it will be noted that the NPs requiring 
special contextualization do not coincide with those frequently defined in formal 
terms as definite (i.e. NPs whose determiner is the, a demonstrative, or a 
possessive, as well as proper names and pronouns). This in tum has consequences 
for what the formally definite NPs oo have in common. 
2. The status of contextualized existentials 
Sentences like those in (2) have a couple of well known distinctive 
characteristics. Pragmatically, they virtually require a context in which a question 
has been raised about the existence of some entity to fill a certain need or other 
role. Thus the examples in (2) are natural answers to the questions in (3), 
respectively. 
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(3) a. What is there to eat? 
b. Are there any sane people in the world?l 
c. How much work is there left to do? 
In view of this property I will henceforth refer to this kind of existential as a 
'contextualized existential' (or CE). Secondly (a related fact) -- an example like 
(2a) may occur with rising (or at any rate non-falling) intonation, as pictured in 
(2a'). 
~ 
(2a') There's the leftover chicken ... 
These characteristics have apparently led a number of people, following Milsark 
(1974: 126-7), to regard sentences like (2) as invoking a (possibly incomplete) list. 
In fact these examples are frequently called 'list' existentials. Furthermore in 
some analyses of existentials this hypostatization of a list plays a crucial role in 
accounting for definiteness effects. In the remainder of this section I will argue 
against such analyses.2 
2.1. Safir's analysis. 
Probably the most extreme example is the analysis in Safir 1985, 1987.3 
Safir regards the superficial similarity of examples such as those in (I) and (2) 
(e.g. dummy there as subject, presence of be4) as concealing important 
differences. While the be in (I) is predicational, and the chere simply a dummy; 
in (2) be is asserted to be 'identificational', and the there 'stands for some 
discourse-controlled presupposed heading of the list' (1985: 119). Thus the 
examples in (2) are held to be similar m structure and interpretation to Safir's 
example (4) (1985: 119): 
(4) The starting five are Bob, Carol, Alice, Ted and Lenin. 
ILarry Hom reminds me !hat the exact quote I am alluding to here is: 'All the world is queer 
save !hee and me, and even thou art a little queer'. attribuled to Robert Owen on separating from 
his business partner William Allen, in 1828. 
21.akoff (1987:561[) bas asserted a similar view concerning list analyses. 
3safir 1987 does not actually discuss CEs, but the anal)·sis of ordinary ellistentials given 
there provides a relevant contrast and aspecls of it will be cited below. 
4Discussion of the presumably related construction with dummy there as subject but main 
verb other than be, such as 
(i) There strode into the room a tall young woman. 
are beyond the scope of this paper. See Aissen 1975, Bolinger 1977, for some early discussion. 
This analysis is inspired by the need to account for Case on the definite NPs in 
focus position. In ordinary existentials, on Safir's analysis, indefinite NPs receive 
Case by being bound by there, and escape Principle C of the Binding Theory by 
not being considered R-expressions. In fact they are considered to be predicate 
nominals. 
There are a number of problems for Safir's analysis.5 Although it is claimed 
to 'account plausibly for the semantics of the list interpretation' (ibid.), it is not 
clear how this is so. Note for instance that replacing be in examples like (2) with 
consists ofor includes is not possible preserving either sense or grammaticality. 
Then too it is not possible to reverse the supposed arguments of be, in contrast to 
the case with ordinary identification statements. Compare the examples in (5) and 
(6) below: 
(5) a. The starting five are Bob, Carol, Alice, Ted and Lenin. 
b. Bob, Carol, Alice, Ted and Lenin are the starting five. 
(6) a. There is the leftover chicken from last night 
b. The leftover chicken from last night is there. 
There in (6b) has only the locational reading -- i.e. (6b) does not mean the same 
thing as (6a). In reply it might be pointed out that proforms in identificational 
sentences frequently cannot occur in obJect position. Thus the example in (7a) 
below, with demonstrative that, is not reversible. 
(7) a. That is Mary. 
b. *Mary is that. 
However note that there in its demonstrative function can appear in object 
position in an identificational sentence, as in (8b): 
(8) a. There is where the forks go. 
b. Where the forks go is there. 
Another problem for Safir's analysis is explaining why there should have this 
particular pronominal type of interpretation only in sentences like those in (2). 
Corresponding to (5a) we can have something like (9a), but this type of use is not 
possible with there, as (9b) shows: 
5see also Heim 1987 for a discussion of lhe problem presented by what Carlson 1977 calls 
'amount relatives', such as example (i): 
(i) What light there is in this painting is quite diffuse 
I am grateful to Greg Stump for reminding me of this. 
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(9) a. The starting five/they are (listed) on the blackboard. 
b.*There is (listed) on the blackboard. 
(We must imagine (9b) as a response to, e.g., What is there on special today?, in 
order to provide the 'discourse controlled presupposed heading of the list'. It 
doesn't help.) 
Finally, Lumsden (1988:133) notes that the relatively high degree of 
referentiality of a number of indefinites in ordinary existentials, such as (10):6 
(10) There was this weird guy in the bookstore this morning. 
weakens the grounds for claiming a distinction between ordinary existentials and 
CEs on the grounds of referentiality. On Safir's analysis this weird guy in ( 10) is a 
predicate nominal, but that does not seem to be right. Note on the one hand that it 
cannot occur as a complement of seem (one of Safir's diagnostics for predicate 
nominals (cf. 1987:86)): 
(11) a. John seems a fool. 
b.*John seems Mary's brother. 
c.*John seems this weird guy. 
And on the other hand it can occur with apparently the same sense and reference it 
has in (10) in ordinary argument positions: 
(12) a. This weird guy came up to me in the bookstore this morning. 
b. I saw this weird guy hanging around the bookstore this morning. 
(See also the examples of ordinary existentials with definite NPs given below in 
section 3.) Safir's analysis is open to other objections aimed generally at 
hypostatization of a list which will be discussed below in section 2.3. 
2.2. Rando and Napoli's analysis. 
Rando and Napoli (1978) also invoke a list as an essential part of their 
account of the definiteness effect. On their theory (1) and (2) do belong to 
basically the same type of construction, and both assert existence. The difference 
lies in what is being asserted to exist, and in (2) 'what is predicated as existing is 
6Prince 1981 argues that NPs like this weird guy in (10) are indefinite but ne,;essarily 
specific. I use this kind of elUllllple because it brings out Lumsden's point especially clearly. The 
same point c:ould have been made with an ordinary indefinite like a 11ery weird guy; the differen,;e 
is that the latter may have a nonspecific:, nonreferential intelpfelation in some c:onte:\ls, while this 
weird guy cannot. 
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the entire listi7 rather than the items on it. Their explanation for the definiteness 
effect itself involves not definiteness but anaphoricity -- the focus NP in an 
existential must be nonanaphoric, in some sense. More specifically, they 
characterize anaphoric NPs as those whose referents are 'previously mentioned or 
otherwise known to both speaker and hearer' (p. 307). This is intended to capture 
the intuition that the focus NP introduces new information. 
Rando and Napoli's analysis is an appealing one, but it too is not without 
problems. Note first that the relevant notion of anaphoricity needs revision in the 
light of examples like (13), which would be strained even in a context in which 
the speaker does not assume the addressee knows of her brother: 
(13) ?There's my brother in the living rtx,m. 
Apparently the degree of accommodation such examples call for (cf. Stalnaker 
1974, Lewis 1979) is not sufficient for assertion. A more serious problem for 
Rando and Napoli is that it is not true that the focus NP in an existential, whether 
or not it is construed as introducing a list of some kind, can never be anaphoric. 
The examples below show this: 
(14) A: Who should greet the guests? 
B: Well, there's John. 
A: Yes, I suppose there's always him. 
(15) A: Don't forget that Kim will be bringing a salad. 
B: Oh right -- there is that. 
The focus NPs in the existentials in these examples are clearly anaphoric in the 
relernnt sense, and the notion of a list will not be helpful here. Rando and Napoli 
say that 'for a list to be non-anaphoric, some aspect of it must be unknown -- must 
be new information, e.g. the choice of members or the number of members' (p. 
311). But neither the choice of referent nor its cardinality is new information in 
either ( 14) or ( 15), and nothing else seems to be new either. 
Rando and Napoli were apparently strongly influenced toward their 'list' 
analysis by the distinctive nonfalling intonation contour of a typical utterance of 
(2a), which they describe as 'the intonation of a list' (p. 300). However this is not, 
in fact, ordinary list intonation (which is a simple rise) but rather a pattern called 
'fall-rise' (or FR) by Ward and Hirschberg 1985 (following Ladd 1980).8 Note the 
7(P. 306) Actually Rando and 1'apoli attribute this assertion to Milsark 1974, 1977, hut 
they do accept it as being 'essentially correct' (p. 307). Furthermore I do not believe Milsark ever 
said exactly this. Milsark's view will be touched on below. 
81 am grateful to Craige Roberts for pointing this out to me in comments following the oral 
presentation of this paper. Ward and Hirschberg cite a number of other discussions of this contour 
(1985:749), which they also refer to in later work (Ward and Hirschberg 1989) as 'L*+H L H%', 
following Pierrehumbert 1980. 
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following examples, in which\/ marks the same FR pattern. ((16) is Ward and 
Hirschberg's (6), and (17) is their (85).) 
(16) A: How can anyone with any sense not like San Francisco? 
B: \Bill/ doesn't like it. 
(17) A: Can you sing a Motels song right now? 
8: Now? 
A: Yeah. 
8: My \cou/sin can. 
On Ward and Hirschberg's analysis examples like those in (l6A) and (17A) 
invoke an open predicate, where potential satisfiers of this predicate form a scale 
(analyzed by Ward and Hirschberg as a partially ordered set (or poset)). It seems 
clear that CEs like (2a) function to suggest items to fulfill certain roles. which 
seems at least consistent with the Ward and Hirschberg analysis.9 Ward and 
Hirschberg argue that the intonation pattern itself conveys a conventional 
implicature of uncertainty, or a lack of speaker commitment. The lack of 
completion this contour conveys could be the result of anticipation by the speaker 
of some kind of judgment on the part of the addressee as to whether the 
suggestion is a gocxl one or adequate for the job at hand. Of course it could be 
maintained that this in turn implies a hypothetical list of some kind -- namely a list 
consisting of other suggestions if the current one is not acceptable. This might 
correspond to Ward and Hirschberg's scale, and may, in fact, be the source of 
Milsark's original intuition that there is a list 'lurking in the background' (see 
below). However even if that were true, there would be no reason to incorporate 
such a list into the truth conditions of examples like (l6B) or B's second utterance 
in (17). As Ward and Hirschberg note, that utterance 'is true if and only if it is 
true that B's cousin "can sing a Motels song right now"' (p. 773). By the same 
token I claim it has no place in the truth conditional semantics of examples like 
those in (2). And note finally that (2a) need not be uttered with the FR intonation 
pattern. It might, in the same context, have a sharp fall indicating a sudden 
inspiration. In that case both the hesitancy, and the implication of other satisfiers 
for the need at hand, would not be present. 
2.3. General arguments against the 'list' hypostasis. 
Above we have looked at two fairly specific versions of the view that CEs 
introduce or make reference to a list of some kind, and seen that there are 
problems with each of them. These two are not the only analyses that invoke a list 
9i am a bit hesitant about !he need to postulate a scale in !hese cases. 
for CEs,10 although they are among the most explicit. I have two arguments 
aimed generally at analyses that invoke a list for CEs. 
My first argument is really a challenge -- how exactly is the list to be 
incorporated into the semantic interpretation of such sentences? I take it as 
uncontroversial that a verbal list is not in question here. We would need 
something more abstracL In another sense a list could be construed as a sequence 
of items, but there is no evidence that ordering is part of the interpretation of 
examples like those in (2). Thus the the truth conditions seem unaffected by 
changes in ordering; (2b) (repeated here) expresses the same proposition as (2b'). 
(2) 	 b. There are only thee and me. 
b'. There are only me and thee. 
Furthermore one can explicitly deny the relevance of order, as in (2c'), below. 
(2) 	 c'. There is the laundry to be brought in and the dishes to be dried, but not 
necessarily in that order. 
We seem to be left with a mereological sum or (equivalently here, I think) a 
set. Milsark 1974 suggests this route, using the examples in ( 18) (his (97)-(99)): 
(18) 	 a. Is there anything worth seeing around here? Well, there's the Necco 
factOI)". 
b. Well, there are all those potholes on Main Street. 
c. Well, there are many of my favorite eyesores. 
One could imagine that in such cases some principle allows the class 
predicate EXIST to take not the set denoted by the (quantified) NP as its 
argument, but rather a hypothetical set which is projected from the NP 
by taking the set actually denoted by NP as a member. This larger set 
would be the 'list' which seems to be lurking in the background of the 
interpretation of sentences such as [(18)). (p. 127) 
Passing over issues to do with the nature of the denotation of the focus NP itself, 
this sketch still leaves unanswered the question of the determination of the 
hypothetical set which is to be 'projected from the NP'. One possible answer in 
the case of ( 18a) would be that the larger set is the singleton which contains the 
denotation of the NP. However this set is completely determined by the NP, and 
thus equally definite. On the other hand if the hypothetical set is required to 
contain at least one additional member, then there arises the question of how the 
additional member is to be determined. Presumably the discourse context would 
IOziv 1982 is one example, although she indicates some hesitancy (p. 77). Belletti 
(I988: 15) is more enthusiastic. 
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come into play here-· so that in example ( 18) the additional items would be things 
to see. However this suggestion would run into problems with examples like ( 19), 
which explicitly assert that there are no additional items of the requested type. 
( 19) A: Is there anything left to do? 
B: There is only the wrapping and mailing .. that's all. 
Alternatively one might try to propose some kind of intensional entity for (18) 
something like the sense of the phrase things to see around here. However that 
move would seem to have trouble getting the truth conditions of sentences like 
(18) correct. (Presumably abstract things like intensions exist independently of 
which particulars happen to fall into their extensions at any given time or place. 
Thus there may be things to see in Cambridge even after the Necco factory is tom 
down.) There may be other possible ways to incorporate a list into the semantics 
of CEs, but the burden of pursuing them is clearly on the person who wants to 
claim that this is the right approach to take. The only reason I can see for doing so 
is to try to maintain the view that definites are excluded from existentials in the 
face of clear counterexamples. 
My final argument against lists is that the invocation of a list does not 
adequately distinguish C& from ordinary existentials. (This may seem odd from 
one who wants to argue that the construction is essentially the same. My point is 
going to be that the construction is syntactically, semantically, and functionally 
essentially the same. It is clear that there are differences, but I want to try to 
explain those differences in pragmatic terms.) Observe first that we can have 
what seem to be quite ordinary existentials where a list of NPs is in focus, e.g. 
(20). 
(20) There are three carrot sticks, some broccoli, and a ny in your soup. 
Note that an example like (20) does not require any special contextualization .. 
i.e. it could begin a discourse. (A suitable next utterance might be Are you sure 
you followed the recipe exactly?) If (20) is, despite this, regarded as also invoking 
a list in the same sense that the examples in (2) are so regarded, then it needs to be 
explained how (20) is different from (la): 
(l) a. There is ally in your soup. 
It is not a possible response to say that in (la) there is only a single NP in focus, 
since that is also true of (2a). By the same token the list analysis does not explain 
the other distinctive property of C& noted above, namely the fact that they 
typically require special contextualization. As just noted, (20) could begin a 
discourse. One can even have an ordinary existential which explicitly introduces 
a list at the beginning of a discourse. Compare (21): 
~ I 
(21) 	 Hi -- there's a list of possible things for dinner posted on the fridge. I'll be 
home about 9:00. Sec you later. 
The examples in ('.!), on the other hand, do not seem suitable for discourse 
openers. An adequate account of CEs and the definiteness effect should give an 
explanation for this. 
3. The 'unified' view, 
Of those analyses which regard CEs like ('.2) as different syntactically and/or 
semantically from ordinarv cxistentials like those in (1), probably the majority 
invoke a list in some way. Il In the preceding section we have seen a number of 
arguments against such approaches. I want to turn now to a 'unified' view of 
cxistentials. This is the view that CEs and ordinary existentials belong to a single 
construction type and have the same kind of semantic interpretation. This 
approach has immediate plausibility in view of the fact that the examples in (1) 
and ('.2) are quite parallel in surface form (although see note 16, below). Note too 
that CEs like (2) typically provide answers to questions which ha\'e been couched 
with ordinary existentiais, such a5 those in (3). It is also the case that both kinds 
of sentences seem to function typically to present items to the addressee, and an 
existence asserting analysis of their meaning seems apropos in both cases. This 
approach also has the methodological edge of Occam's Razor. 
To complete this happy picture we need to provide an explanation for the 
fact that CEs typically cannot be felicitously used to initiate a discourse. This 
follows almost immediately from two facts. One is that the focus in such 
examples is an NP whose denotation is explicitly presumed to be familiar to the 
addressee. The other fact is that, gi\·en this, it should be anomalous simply to 
assert the existence of such an entity. Howe\"er it is not anomalous if the 
existence of this entlly is pointed out a, a response to a request for entitles to 
11Therc are other possibilities, of course. Some (Heim 1987, Higginbotham 1987, En~ 
1991) simply do no! mention CEs. Keenan 1987 seems to ignore them for the most part, but does 
assert that (on his analysis, and correctly) existentials which have a focus ~P with a definite 
delemuner do not have an 'existence assertion' reading. Thus he states !hat (ia) below has only !he 
reading of (ih) and nOl (ic) (p. 3M) 
(i) 	 a. There w·ere most of the srudcn!S at the party. 
h. Most of !he srudents were at the party. 
c. !vlost of the stndenls at the party ellisted. 
However this is not true. (ia) can ha\'e the reading of (ic) as a response to a question like (ii): 
{ii) 	 How many people were there at the pep talk following the party? 
On the other hand ii is not clear lo me that (ia) can ha,·e the interpretation of (ib) at all. 
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fulfill a certain role, or a request for entities of a certain type.12 In such a context 
to assert the existence of something which is assumed to be known to the 
addressee becomes a polite way to suggest that entity as suitable for the purposes 
at hand. It is polite because it is indirect -- as Lumsden notes (1988. p. 224) both 
(22b) and (22c) are possible answers to the question in (22a): 
(22) a. What could I give my sister for her birthday? 
b. John's book on birdwatching. 
c. There's John's book on birdwatching. 
However, Lumsden argues, while (22b) asserts (23), (22c) only implicates it 
(23) You could give your sister John's book on birdwatching. 
Lumsden points out that the implicature is cancellable with (22c), but the assertion 
of (22b) is not cancellable: 13 
(24) a. What could I give my sister for her birthday? 
b ?John's book on birdwatching, but I'm not suggesting it's a 	suitable 
present. 
c. 	 There's John's book on birdwatching, but I'm not suggesting it's a 
suitable present. 
Note too the apparent need for politeness here. As noted above, use of the 
anaphoric definite implies the speaker is assuming the addressee is familiar with 
the referent. Hence in this kind of context, that is in the face of a request by the 
addressee for entities for some purpose, it must be supposed that the addressee has 
either forgotten about the existence of this entity, or hasn't considered it as a 
possibility for the purpose at hand. The existential construction allows the 
speaker lo make a suggestion without preempting the addressee's right to make 
their own judgment as to its suitability. 
I need to acknowledge at this point that the explanation offered here ha~ an 
element of the post hoc about it. One could ask why it should be considered polite 
to assert the existence of an entity that you are in the same breath acknowledging 
your addressee's familiarity with. It is not inconceivable that to do this should, on 
occasion or in some possible world, be construed a~ rude. Hence I wouldn't want 
to predict that this kind of sentence is universally usable in this way. Nevertheless 
it seems clear that in present day English examples like (22c) are in fact more 
12Again I want to stress that a number of people have already asserted essentially this view, 
e.g. Bolinger 1977, Barwise and Cooper 1981, Woisetschlaeger 1983, Lakoff 1987 and Lumsden 
1988. (I should note that I did not become aware of the excellent discussion in Lumsden 1988 
until quite recently. after the main content of this paper was already fonnulated.) 
131 have changed Lumsden's examples slightly. See his discussion. pp. 215-25. 
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polite than ones like (22b), and the account offered above provides at least a 
partial explanation of that fact. 14 
It has been suggested that CE;; are subject to some other peculiar restrictions 
in addition to those noted already. Rando and Na_lX)li cite Hankamer I 973 as 
claiming that CE;; do not allow future or perfect tenses, or negation, but give the 
examples below in reply (n. 14, p. 311). 
(25) Q: What will be there be to see in London? 
A: 	 There'll be the Tower of London, St. Paul's, and much more. 
(26) Q: What families have ruled England? 
A: There have been the Plantegenets, the Tudors, and the Stuarts. 
(27) Q: What is there to see around here? 
A: 	?well, there isn't the Washington Monument anymore·· that wa~ swept 
away in the Oood. 
Note too that the account supported here predicts that negative, as well as 
interrogative, CEs should be odd (note Rando and Napoli's question mark for 
(27A)). It ought to be odd to deny or question the existence of something whose 
existence you are explicitly presupposing. On the other hand when negative 
questions arc used as tentative positive assertions, we would expect the 
naturalness which we find in an example like (28), for which I thank Bill 
Ladusaw. 
(28) Isn't there the leftover chicken from last night? 
Finally Geoff Nunberg contributed the examples in (29): 
(29) a. Is there the IRS to worry about? 
b. Tex) bad there isn't Dick Nixon to kick around anymore. 
Given what I just said about predicting badness for negative and interrogative 
CEs, these examples need an explanation which I do not have at present. It may 
be that the infinitival complement is, in effect, what makes these o.k. 
At this point I would like to summarize the view defended above before 
turning to a consideration of the nature of definiteness. The view defended here 
starts with the assumption (shared by many) that existential sentences are 
interpreted as assertions of existence.IS The definiteness effect, reinterpreted 
14tn the discussion following the talk questions were raised about the possibility of CEs in 
other languages. It was reponed to me that these are fine in Dutch, but there seemed to be some 
doubt about their possibility in Gennan and French (but cf the remarks by Rando and Napoli 
(1978:312)). 1bis issue requires funher investigation. 
15craige Robens and Alessandro Zucchi bolb stressed to me in comments following this 
talk that e~stentials cannot be held lo assen ordinary, real world e~stence. 1bis issue is discussed 
at greater length in Abbott 1991. 
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here as a requirement of special contextualization for NPs which indicate that the 
speaker assumes the addressee is familiar with their denotation, is held to be a 
pragmatic consequence of this interpretation. Thus the distinctive properties of 
CEs are explained with a minimum of arbitrary stipulation or unmotivated 
apparatus.16 We saw above that one attempt to give an account of the 
definiteness effect syntactically -- in terms of Case marking -- suffered from a 
number of unsolved problems. We saw also that the Milsark/Rando and Napoli 
semantic account was problematic. I have not shown that no purely syntactic or 
semantic analysis of existentials and the definiteness effect can succeed, but the 
prospects for such an eventuality do not look bright.17 
4. Definiteness. 
We turn now to a brief consideration of the nature of definiteness. Definite 
NPs are typically defined formally to include (in addition to personal pronouns 
and proper names} NPs whose determiner is the, a possessive NP, or a 
demonstrative. As is well known, there have been traditionally two major 
competing conceptions of what this group of NPs have in common. 
Christopherson 1939 argued that the essence of definiteness was familiarity, and 
Heim 1982 incorporated this theory into her file change semantics. Russell's 
analysis of definite descriptions imposed instead a condition of uniqueness (which 
161:n this context it should be pointed out that there are two other distinctive properties of 
CEs which require an e;,;planation. The first is the fact that whereas ordinary e:tistentials may 
include a predicating phrase in addition to the focus Nl', CEs are definitely constrained in this 
regard. Thus in the ordinary existential in (ia) the PP is a separate constituent. but the PP in (ib) 
must be construed as part of the focussed NP. 
(i) a. There's a book on the table. 
b. There's the book on the table. 
((ib) is heard naturally as an answer to a question like What can we use to prop open the window") 
In Abbott 1991 I attempt to account for this property in pragmatic terms. 
The other property is the greater ability of CEs to lack number agreement with the focus 
NP. Thus compare the examples in (ii} and (iii): 
(ii) a There are three apples on the table. 
b. 1There's three apples on the table.  
c *There is three apples on the table.  
(iii) A: ls there anything to eat? 
B: There are the apples we bought yesterday. 
B': There's the apples we lx>ught yesterday.  
B": There is the apples we bought yesterday.  
I am grateful to Arnold Zwicky for pointing this phenomenon out to me. Unfortunately I do not 
have an explanation for it at present. 
17see Abbott 1991 for more extensive arguments in favor of a pragmatic view and against 
syntactic and semantic accounts. 
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differentiates them from indefinites). This view was supported by Hawkins, who 
argued however (on the basis of definite plurals and mass NPs) that the essence 
was inclusiveness rather than uniqueness: ' ... reference must be to the totality of 
objects or mass ... ' (I 978: 160). Hawkins' 'inclusi\'eness' could be taken as the 
natural extension of 'uniqueness' to masses and plun1ls. Given a group, in general 
there is only one unique subgroup (that is, there is only one which is uniquely 
detennined by just the descriptive material in a CNP whose extension is the 
group), and that is the one which is equal to the whole. This inclusiveness or 
uniqueness must be relativized to the context in some way. Hawkins' speaks of a 
'shared set of objects' -- that is, shared by speaker and addressee.18 
Given the view of existcntials supported here, and the assumption that the 
definiteness effect is appropriately named, we would expect to find support for the 
familiarity theory. That is, ordinary existcntials should exclude definites because 
of their presumed familiarity (or accommodatability, as noted abo\'e in connection 
with (13)). Any occurrence of a definite in focus position should introduce the 
requirement of special contextualization, because of the anomaly of asserting the 
existence of something marked as familiar to the addressee. Howe\·cr this is not 
the case.19 At least some cataphoric definites ('where what follows the head 
noun, rather than what precedes it, enables us to pinpoint the reference uniquely' 
(Quirk, et al. l 985:268)) can occur in ordinary existentials. One clear example is 
the following, from En9 1991 (attributed to David Pesetsky): 
(30) There are the following counterexamples to Streck's theory ... 
NPs like that focussed in (30) provide support for the uniqueness/inclusiveness 
view of definiteness and against the familiarity view.20 (30) itself suggests that 
the crucial factor as far as existential sentences go is (as Prince 1992 notes) not 
definiteness but familiarity. Note that such cases must be distinguished from 
cases frequently described as in\'olving accommodation such as example (13) 
above. (30) should also be distinguished from a number of examples of formally 
definite NPs occurring in ordinary existcntials such as the following: 
18See \\'ilson 1991 for arguments that the uniqueness propeny as described here cannot be 
e:ilten<led to all uses of definite descriptions, and that we must recogni1.e a 'pronominal' use as a 
distinct type of reading. It is nevertheless true that the reference of definiles is fixed, even on the 
pronominal use, in contrast lo the use of indefinites. 
l!>fhis point is made b>· Prince (1992), who says 'In point of fact, There-sentences do not 
require indefinite NPs at all; rather, they require Hearer-new NPs' (p. 9). I would modify this 
claim in a couple of ways. Firsl, of course, I would restrict it to ordinary There-sentences. But in 
addition the assertion that these NPs 'e,·oke an entity that is Hearer-new' (p. 10) needs at least 
some discussion m the light of examples such as those in (30) below (which are similar to 
e11amples cited by Prince). See below, where it is suggested (following Woisetschlaeger 1983 and 
Lumsden 1988) that the 'hearer-new' entity in question is an instance of a kind of thing. 
20see also the discussion in Kadmon 1990. 
I~ 
(31) a. There weren't the funds necessary for the pro1ect. [Bolinger 1977] 
b. There was never that problem in America. [Rando and Napoli 1978] 
c. There was the usual crowd at the beach last Sunday. [Prince 1981] 
d. 	 There was the smell of pot all over the apartment. [Woisetschlaeger 
1983] 
e. There were the same people at both conferences. [Prince 1992] 
f. There is always the possibility that they'll be late. 
Any of these (like (30)) could be used to begin a discourse (possibly with 
irrelevant modifications). Hence they must be classified as ordinary existentials 
rather than CB;. However for at least some of these examples it does not seem to 
be true that the focus NP denotes something unfamiliar to the addressee. Indeed, 
in (31 b) that problem clearly refers deictically to a problem under discussion; in 
(31c) the phrase the usual crowd seems to entail that the entity denoted is in fact 
familiar to the addressee; and (3 Id) seems to assume familiarity with the smell of 
pot. The best explanation for these examples seems to be along the lines proposed 
in Woisetschlaeger 1983, and elaborated in Lumsden 1988. That is that the 
definite NPs in (30) denote kinds of things, in some sense, and what is being 
introduced are instances of those kinds. It remains to be seen how such an 
approach, if correct, is best formalized. 
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